

Def. Doc. #2263

Exh. No.

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent :-HOSOKAWA, Morisada

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, HOSOKAWA, Morisada, make oath and say as follows :

I. I am 36 years old and in April, 1936 I married KONOYE, Yoshiko, daughter of Princess KONOYE, Fumimaro, and as his son-in-law I naturally had many private conversations with Prince KONOYE.

My public or official relations with Prince KONOYE and Marquis KIDO started on July 23, 1940 when I assumed the post of Secretary to the Prime Minister of the second KONOYE Cabinet and continued until October 16, 1941 when I resigned as Secretary to the Prime Minister of the third KONOYE Cabinet. This was the first stage of my public or official relations with Prince KONOYE and Marquis KIDO. Later, during the war, I acted as private secretary to Prince KONOYE in addition to other duties.

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Simultaneous with the formation of the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet, which came into existence following Japan's surrender on August 16, 1945 I assumed the post of Secretary to Prince KONOYE who was Minister of State without portfolio in the Cabinet, and resigned from the post when the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet resigned en bloc.

My private association with Prince KONOYE, Marquis KIDO and Baron HARADA had its inception in my father Marquis HOSOKAWA Moritatsu's friendship with them, so that I had frequent opportunities to meet them from my childhood. But after the May 15th incident in 1932 I began to take an interest in public affairs and listened to Prince KONOYE, Marquis KIDO and Baron HARADA discussing them. In those hectic days, the Army began to tyrannize over the country, showing the cloven foot in spite of itself. I recall that Prince KONOYE, Marquis KIDO and Baron HARADA many a time gave vent to their indignation over the Army's high-handedness. I heard them discuss ways and means of how to restrain the tyrannical Army, which they denounced in scathing terms for its attempts at provoking a war so as to carry out a domestic reform. At that time, Prince KONOYE was President of the House of Peers, Marquis KIDO Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Baron HARADA Private Secretary to Prince SAIONJI, the Genro or Elder Statesman. I was able to obtain full information from Prince KONOYE on the ominous situation, especially since he had just declined the offer of the Premiership immediately after the outbreak of the February 26th incident, in 1936. Prince KONOYE, Marquis KIDO and Baron HARADA were really worried about the Army which was their

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daily topic of conversation. I remember having heard them often lament:

"If the Army is left as it is, it will certainly start war. And Japan will be ruined by her Army."

I also recall that they expressed the pathetic hope:

"We wish that the Army were made into an orderly organization by somebody. We hope somebody will be able to do it."

3. The China Affair or hostilities between Japan and China started 33 days after the formation of the 1st KONOYE Cabinet on June 4th, 1937.

Prince KONOYE told me that he did not have the slightest knowledge of any Army plan to commence the "China Affair." I know that he spared no efforts to bring the affair to a close as early as possible, as shown by his memoirs. As he later often stated reminiscently, the China Affair could be reduced to a domestic issue, or a question for the Army, so that if only the Army regained order and unity, the entire question would find its own solution. Considered in this light, Prince KONOYE often discussed how he could purge the Army at home and later how he could bring the negotiations with America to an amicable conclusion.

Details about his intentions and policies will be found in his memoirs, "Shina Jihonni Tsuite" (On the China Affair) and "Nichibeikosho no Keika" (Progress of the Japanese-American Negotiation) and his will.

4. Immediately before the resignation of his third Cabinet en bloc, which occurred October 16, 1941, Prince KONOYE who was deeply concerned over the situation, then prevailing, deplored in an indignant, but yet staid tone and I heard him say:

"The Navy is opposed to war with America. It is indeed cowardly of the Navy not to avow its opposition."

5. This is a story I heard from Prince KONOYE upon the concurrent assumption of the Portfolio of War by General TOJO. When Prince KONOYE had a chat with General TOJO after the adjournment, possibly of a conference of senior statesman, which followed the formation of the TOJO Cabinet, the General said to the Prince:

"Even though I concurrently hold the portfolio of War as I am a General in active service, I can not get my own way. Now I fully understand what trouble you had in your efforts as you were a Civilian Prime Minister."

6. Prince KONOYE told me he was very apprehensive about what course the Army would take when he assumed the Premiership for the third time on July 17, 1941. Nobody could tell what untoward incidents would crop up, if the Army was left as it was because the Army was like a wild horse, which broke loose. Embracing Pacifist ideas and advocating cooperation with America as he did, he told me it was his intention to harness and control the Army in efforts to make it follow a peaceful course. Taking warning of the failure of the first KONOYE Cabinet, he attempted to concentrate new political power to oppose the Army when he formed the second KONOYE Cabinet. This is why the Taisei Yokusan Kei (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) was formed. Contrary to his intentions however, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association turned out to be entirely different from what had been



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envisioned by Prince KONOYE, due to the Army's control of it, agitation for Nazification and opposition from Admiral SUMISUGU and part of the Home Ministry bureaucrats.

7. Prince KONOYE told me Marquis KIDO's efforts for terminating the war, "Marquis KIDO's efforts for terminating the war have been indeed magnificent." I recall that Prince KONOYE often paid this compliment to Marquis KIDO from the time when the Prince was chosen as special envoy to the Soviet Union (though he did not go to the Soviet Union) to Japan's surrender.

On this 7 day of Feb. 1947

At I., M. T. F. E.

DEPONENT /S/ HOSOKAWA, Morisada (seal)

I, HOZUMI, Shigetaka, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date, at same place.

At

Witness: /S/ HOZUMI, Shigetaka (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ HOSOKAWA, Morisada (seal)

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國 其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓 供 述 書

供 述 者 細 川 護 貞

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル  
上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

宣  
誓  
書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ默秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

(署名捺印)  
細  
川  
設  
貞

私、細川護貞ハ宣誓ノ上左ノ通り陳述致シマス。

一、私ハ三十六歳デ一九三六年（昭和十一年）近衛文麿公夫妻ノ女溫子ト結婚シマシタ。ソレデ近衛公トハ當然婿トシテ度々會談シマシタ。

近衛公ト木戸侯ト私トノ公的関係ハ私ガ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二十三日第二次近衛内閣ノ總理大臣秘書官ニ就任シマシタカラ引續キ第三次近衛内閣ヲ經テ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十月十六日退官スル迄ヲ第一期トシテ居リマス。

又其後戰爭中ハ他ノ職務ニハツキナガラモ近衛公ノ私設秘書トシテ行動ヲ共ニシテ居マシタガ、終戰ト同時ニ一九四五年（昭和二十年）八月十六日成立シタ東京近衛内閣ノ國務大臣デアツタ近衛公ノ秘書官トナリ同内閣ノ桂冠ト共ニ退官シマシタ。

私的関係ハ父侯爵細川設立ト近衛公、木戸侯及ビ原田男トノ交友ニ始ツテ居マス。從ツテ私ハ幼少ノ頃カラ此三人ニ御目ニ掛ル機會ヲ多ク持ツタノデス。

二、併シ一九三二年（昭和七年）ノ五・一五事件以後私ハ政治ニ興味ヲ持テ始メ近衛公、木戸侯、原田男ガ議論サレテ居ルノヲ聞キマシタ。當時之等ノ事件ノ後ヲ受ケテ漸ク軍部（陸軍）ガ横暴ヲ逞シクセントスル頃デアリ



マワシタカラ、軍ノ横暴ヲ對スル奮慨、如何ニシテ陸軍ノ横暴ヲ押ヘル可キ  
 カ、殊ニ陸軍ガ戦争ヲ起シテ國內ノ革新ヲ強行セント試ミツ、アルハトモ  
 對スル批難ヲ此ノ三人ノ方ノ夫々カラ而モ度々伺ツタコトガアリマシタ。  
 其時近衛公ハ貴族院議長、木戸侯ハ内大臣秘書官長、原田男ハ元老西園寺  
 公ノ秘書ヲ務メテ居ラレ、殊ニ近衛公ハ一九三六年（昭和十一年）二・二  
 六事件直後内閣組織ノ大命ヲ拜辭サレタ時デアリマシタカラ、ソレ等ノ消  
 息ニ就テ詳シク伺フコトヲ得タノデアリマス、

近衛公、木戸侯、原田男等ハ陸軍ノ専横ヲ最モ憂ヘ私ハ此三人カラ屢々  
 「此儘陸軍ヲ放置スレバ戦争ヲ始メル。ソシテ日本ハ陸軍ヲ爲メ亡サレル」  
 ト云フ會話ハ日常茶飯事ノ如ク此三人ノ間ニ言交ハサレタ。又「誰デモイ、  
 カラ陸軍ヲ一ツノ秩序アル組織體ニシテ賞ヒ處イ。吾々ハ之ヲ出來ル誰  
 ニデモ希望スル。」トノ希望ヲ述ベラレルノヲ聞イタコトガアリマシタ。  
 三、支那事變ハ一九三七年（昭和十二年）六月四日第一次近衛内閣成立後三  
 十三日ヨリ突發シタ事件デアリマス。近衛公ハ支那事變ニ計畫シタ陸軍内  
 務ノ際略ヲ少シモ知ラナカッタト私ニ語りマシタ。從ツテ之ヲ解決スル凡  
 ル努力ヲ惜シマナカッタコトハソノ手記ノ明示スル所デアリマス。私ハ知

ツテ居ルコトデス。其後屢々遺憾サレタ様ニ支那事變ハ要スルニ内問題  
 デアリ、即チ陸軍ノ問題デアルノデス。陸軍ガ秩序ト統一ヲ回復シサヘス  
 レバ一切ノ問題ガ正ニ解消スル。從ツテ公ハ屢々如何ニシテ内ニ於テ陸  
 軍ヲ肅正スルコトガ出來ルカラ又、如何ニシテ日米ノ圓滿解決ガ出來ルカ  
 ヲ屢々議論サレタノモ此ノ考ヘヨルタメデス  
 此ノ間ノ事情ハ「支那事變ニ就テ」及ビ「日米交渉ノ經過」等ノ手記及遺  
 書ニ極メテ明瞭ダト思ヒマス

四、一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月十六日第三次近衛内閣總辭職ノ直前、近  
 衛公ハ極メテ沈痛ナ面持テ事態ヲ憂慮シテ居ラレマシタガ、「海軍ハ對米  
 戦争ニ反對ガアルニ拘、ドウシテモ反對ノ意志ヲ公言シナイ。實ニ卑怯  
 ナ態度ダ。」ト奮慨シテ居ラレタノヲ私ハ聞キマシタ。

五、私ハ東條大將ガ陸軍大臣ヲ兼任サレテ居タトキノコト、東條大將ガ組閣  
 後、確カ重臣ノ會合ノ散會後近衛公ト二人デ話ヲサレタ折東條大將ハ公ニ  
 向ヒ「自分ガ現役軍人デ陸相ヲ兼攝シテサヘ中々思フ様ニ行カヌノニ貴下  
 ガ文官ノ總理デアレダケヤラレタ御苦心ノ程ハ今ニナツテヨク解ル」ト語  
 ツタ由、近衛公カラ聞キマシタ。

六、

近衛公ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月十七日三度ビ總理トナラレタ時  
 陸軍ノ行方ニ深イ憂慮ヲ拘イテ居ラレマシタ。恰モ奔馬ヲ放置スルガ如ク  
 陸軍ノ主張ヲソノマ、放置スレバ如何ナル橋亭ヲ引起スヤモ計ラレナイ。  
 公ハ元來平和主義ヲ抱懷シ殊ニ目米提携論者デアリマシタカテ自愛此ノ陸  
 軍ヲ驚禦スルノ任ヲ引受ケ、之ヲ平常平和ノ軌道ニ復セシメント意圖サレ  
 タルコトヲ私ハ公ノ談話ヨリ知ツテ居マス。

殊ニ第二次内閣ノ組閣ニ當ツテハ第一次内閣ノ失敗ニ鑑ミ、新ナル政治力  
 ヲ結集シテ陸軍ニ對抗セシメントシマシタ。之ガ何故大政翼賛會ヲ作ルニ  
 到ツタカノ原因デス。併シ是亦陸軍ノナチ化セントスル運動ト末次海軍大  
 將及ビ一部内務官僚ノ反對ニ遇シテ公ノ企圖トハ全ク似テモ似ツカサル  
 存在ト化シタノデアリマス。

七、

近衛公ハ木戸侯ノ終戦ニ就テノ努力ヲ常ニ「木戸ノ終戦ニ就テノ努力ハ  
 素晴シイモノデアッタ」ト私ニ話シテ居ラレマシタ。是ハ丁度公ガ蘇聯ヘ  
 使サレレコトニナツテ以來終戦ニ到ル期間常ニ口ニサレタコトデシタ。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）二月七日 於東京

極東國際軍事裁判所

供 述 者 細 川 護 貞

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 目 於 同 所

立 會 人 總 務 長 官 成